










VOLATILITY OF EXCHANGE RATES 
IN SELECTED NEW EU MEMBERS: 








CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 2107 






An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 




VOLATILITY OF EXCHANGE RATES 
IN SELECTED NEW EU MEMBERS: 





We examine the daily exchange rate dynamics in selected new EU member states (Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia) using GARCH and TARCH models 
between 1999 and 2006. Despite these countries adopted inflation targeting regime, they 
occasionally tried to manage their exchange rate. We find that the low credibility of exchange 
rate management implied higher volatility of exchange rates when it substantially deviated 
from the implicit target rates for all countries. Finally, we find significant asymmetric effects 
of the volatility of exchange rates in all analyzed countries. 
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1 Introduction 
All new member states (NMS) of the EU face a trade-off between exchange rate 
stability and flexibility. The recent literature on optimum currency area (OCA) criteria 
in the NMS surveyed by Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2006) shows that these countries 
increasingly constitute an optimum currency area with the EMU. Similarly, Horváth 
(2007) finds that the NMS fulfill OCA criteria at approximately the same level as the 
euro area countries before they adopted euro, suggesting that the benefits of exchange 
rate stability may prevail.  
By contrast, the developments especially in Central Europe
1 showed a process of 
increasing exchange rate flexibility during the previous decade (see Markievicz, 2006, 
and Frömmel and Schobert, 2006). This development has been reversed only recently 
by the first accessions to the Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II) and the starting 
process of euro adoption in the NMS of the EU.
2 In the specific conditions of these 
countries, relatively flexible exchange rate regimes have appeared to be appropriate to 
deal with the high capital flows, productivity improvements and the appreciation of 
exchange rates also in nominal terms (see Égert and Lommatzsch, 2004). At the same 
time, the exchange rate peg was replaced by monetary policies, putting more emphasis 
on inflation stabilization. Actually, nearly all countries of our sample have adopted 
different types of inflation targeting.
3 Still, several NMS have used interventions at the 
foreign exchange market (see Égert, 2007, Égert and Komárek, 2006, or Geršl and 
Holub, 2006). On the one hand, these actions were largely motivated by inflation and 
competitiveness pressures, which in small and open economies heavily depend on 
                                                           
1 On the other hand, several smaller transition economies in South East Europe and in the Baltics have 
adopted currency boards or comparably fixed exchange rate regimes. This development confirms 
Eichengreen’s (1994) bipolar hypothesis that small and open economies have to decide between the 
extreme points of exchange rate flexibility.  
2 Estonia, Lithuania and Slovenia joined the ERM II in 2004, while Cyprus, Malta, Latvia and Slovakia 
followed in 2005. Furthermore, Slovenia introduced the euro by January 2007, while Cyprus and Malta 
will follow in January 2008.  
3 Czech Republic and Poland adopted inflation targeting in 1998, Romania and Slovakia followed after a 
period of informal inflation targeting in 2005. Hungary adopted inflation targeting regime in mid-2001 
and accompanied it with managed exchange rate with the fluctuation band of ±15%. 3 
exchange rates. On the other hand, this development corresponds also to the fear of 
floating phenomenon analyzed by Calvo and Reinhart (2002).  
These arguments mean that some NMS are likely to pursue a de facto exchange rate 
policy of implicit target zones around time-varying target exchange rates,
4 which is 
similar to the proposal of target zone around a fundamental equilibrium exchange rate 
proposed by Williamson (1985), Edison et al. (1987), and Chmelarova and Schnabl 
(2006). Similarly like in Krugman’s (1991) exchange rate target zone model, the 
volatility of exchange rate at the borders of target zones should be smaller than in the 
area close to the central parity if the regime is fully credible. In the opposite case, we 
should observe that exchange rate volatility increases with the distance from the target 
exchange rates. The opposite case is especially appealing for us, as we model the 
countries that did not adopt official target zones, but rather tried to keep the exchange 
rates relatively stable. 
Furthermore, expectations may be in principle formed differently in the appreciation 
and depreciation parts of the target zones (either de jure or de facto), which may cause 
systematic asymmetric effects. This pattern of exchange rate behavior can be estimated 
by generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) models. 
Potential asymmetry in exchange rate volatility is addressed by threshold autoregressive 
conditional heteroskedasticity (TARCH) models. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the literature on the 
exchange rate target zones. Section 3 presents data and Section 4 estimates GARCH 
models. Finally, Section 5 concludes. Additionally sensitivity results are presented in 
the appendix.  
 
2 Related Literature  
A fixed exchange rate regime with a non-zero fluctuation band is generally referred to 
as a target zone (see for example Ghosh et al., 2003). The motivation for maintaining a 
target zone exchange rate regime is typically that some flexibility in exchange rate 
                                                           
4 For example, the National Bank of Slovakia declared its official conduct of the monetary policy as 
“inflation targeting in the conditions of the ERM II” in 2004 (see NBS, 2004). Nell (2004, p. 24) states 
that “implicit inflation targeting … is not in conflict with the exchange rate arrangement and has thus far 
served the NBS rather well”.  4 
fluctuations is allowed, while the bands in principle assure an elimination of the 
eventually excessive fluctuations common under free float exchange rate regime. For a 
comprehensive survey of this literature, we refer the reader to Kempa and Nelles 
(1999), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998), and Sarno and Taylor (2002). Bessec (2003) and 
Chung and Tauchen (2001) review models with asymmetric and implicit target zones.  
Krugman (1991) provides a seminal contribution to an analysis of exchange rate 
dynamics under target zones. The early naive approach to exchange rate modeling in the 
target zone assumed that the exchange rate behaves as the free float inside the band and 
as the fixed exchange rate regime at the edge of the band. In consequence, the 
fluctuation band has no influence on exchange rate behavior inside the band. However, 
Krugman (1991) stresses the role of exchange rate expectations and argues that the 
existence of a credible fluctuation band influences the exchange rate behavior not only 
at the edge of the band, but also inside the band. Consequently, when the exchange rate 
is close to the edge of the band, the foreign exchange market participants expect 
interventions to keep the exchange rate inside the band. As a result, the expected change 
of the exchange rate is non-zero. It is positive if the exchange rate reaches the weaker 
side of the fluctuation band, and vice versa. Thus, exchange rate is mean-reverting (this 
is typically labeled as honeymoon effects in the target zone literature). Besides, the 
exchange rate becomes completely insensitive to fundamentals at the edges of the band 
(which is referred to as smooth pasting).  
There have been several papers examining the Krugman model empirically. Engle 
and Gau (1997) examine whether the position of spot exchange rate within the band is 
associated to its volatility using the data from several EU countries participating in the 
European Monetary System between 1986 and 1993. They find rather mixed support for 
the Krugman model, namely only in a few countries the negative relationship between 
the deviation of the exchange rate from its central parity and the exchange rate volatility 
is detected. Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2005a) study exchange rate dynamics in a majority 
of EU members over different sample periods. Primarily, they test for the so-called 
effective band within the officially announced band. The motivation is that central 
banks typically do not wait until the exchange rate hits the official band, but rather start 
intervening already within the band. Chmelarova and Schnabl (2006) discuss the 5 
intervention pattern based on Krugman’s model in Croatia as compared to developed 
countries.  
Exchange rate volatility in selected NMS is also analyzed by Kočenda and Valachy 
(2006) and Schnabl (2008). They find that exchange rate volatility generally increased 
with the introduction of more flexible exchange rate arrangements. Furthermore, the 
level of interest rates differential decreases exchange rate volatility, while the volatility 
of interest rates differential has the opposite effect.  
 
3 Data description  
Our dataset contains the daily euro exchange rates in the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Romania, Hungary, and Slovakia between January 1997 and May 2007. However, we 
restrict our data sample to the period starting in January 1999. On the one hand, the 
starting point of our analysis is determined by the creation of the euro. Thus, we avoid 
observations characterized by possibly non-standard volatility due to the change-over in 
the euro area countries. On the other hand, all NMS introduced inflation targeting 
regime in this period with less emphasis on exchange rate stabilization. These countries 
also did not experience any currency crisis during the analyzed time. We exclude all 
countries with currency boards (Bulgaria and the Baltic States) and Slovenia, which 
introduced the euro in 2007, from our analysis.  
As a result, our analysis concentrates on the daily exchange rates of euro in the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Romania between January 1997 and 
May 2007. The implicit target exchange rate is approximated by 240
th moving average 
mode (that is, the average of ±120 trading days or approximately one year).
5 The 
computation of moving average restricts our estimation period from January 1999 to 
October 2006, which provides about 2000 observations.
6  
                                                           
5 Moving average, as the approximation of equilibrium exchange rate, is also adopted by e.g. Ito and 
Yabu (2007) and Chmelarova and Schnabl (2006). 
6 Alternatively, we use the time variable trend proxied by the Hodrick-Prescott filter (available upon 
request from authors).  6 
Figure 1: Exchange Rates vis-à-vis Euro, January 1999 to October 2006 


































































































































Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Daily Exchange Rates, January 1999 to October 
2006  
 Czech  Rep.  Hungary  Poland  Slovakia  Romania 
Mean 32.525 253.596 4.083 41.404  3.028
Median 31.883 252.555 4.055 41.772  3.365
Maximum 38.583 283.350 4.935 46.977  4.143
Minimum 28.000 234.720 3.343 36.840  1.287
Standard deviation  2.730 8.808 0.314 2.226  0.840
Coefficient of variation (%)  8.393 3.473 7.684 5.376  27.727
Skewness 0.276 0.585 0.301 -0.268  -0.476
Kurtosis 2.005 3.112 2.826 2.107  1.832
Jarque-Bera test  109.403 116.877 33.107 91.721  191.726
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000]
Observations 2028 2028 2028 2028  2028
Notes:  p-values are reported in the brackets.  
 
The selected new member states of the EU used highly heterogeneous de facto and 
de jure exchange rate policies. All countries in our sample allowed officially for free 
exchange rate movement to a significant degree. However, only Poland has been widely 
acknowledged not to intervene in the foreign exchange market (see Frömmel and 
Schobert, 2006). In turn, the Czech Republic and Slovakia allowed for considerable but 
controlled fluctuations of their currencies. Similarly, Hungary followed a policy of 
broad fluctuation bands (since 2001), while Romania had a de facto crawling peg until 
2005.  
These institutional differences cause also different developments of nominal 
exchange rates against the euro. Figure 1 presents the exchange rate developments for 
our sample countries. Generally, nominal exchange rate appreciation is visible for the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia. On the other hand, the Polish exchange rate does not 
seem to exhibit any pattern during the analyzed period. Finally, the Romanian leu 
depreciates substantially until 2004, which corresponds to the de facto crawling peg 
applied by the Bank of Romania. Furthermore, we can see in all selected NMS that the 
periods of high exchange rate volatility are usually associated with fast movements 
either in the appreciation or depreciation directions.  
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics between January 1999 and October 2006. 
Using the coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by mean of individual 8 
currencies), Hungarian and Slovak currencies are characterized by the most stable 
exchange rates, followed by the Polish zloty and Czech koruna. However, there were 
different sources of volatility between the countries. Depreciation dominated only in 
Romania until 2004, while appreciation trends played an important role in the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, and Romania (since 2005). The volatility in Hungary and Poland is 
mainly due to frequent changes of depreciation and appreciation developments.  
 
4 Results 
4.1 GARCH Models 
The GARCH models are generally applied for the estimations of the conditional 
volatility of high-frequency (daily) exchange rate changes (see Baillie and Bollerslev, 
1989). Following Engle and Gau (1997), we test one of the implications of the Krugman 
(1991) model of target zones. Krugman shows that the conditional volatility of 
exchange rate decreases as exchange rate approaches the edge of the target band. As a 
result, we estimate whether the deviation of the exchange rate from its target rate 
decreases the conditional volatility. Our baseline specification is a GARCH(1,1) model,  
  jt j
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2 , (2) 
where s
D and s
F denote the spot daily exchange rate of currency to euro and the time 
varying target rate (moving average of ±120 trading days), respectively. We do not 
include any explanatory variables except for constant to equation (1), because daily 
exchange rates are expected to be influenced largely by news and other random events 
(see Bask and Fidrmuc, 2006, for the discussion of high-frequency exchange rate 
movements in the NMS). The constant term in equation (1), μ, shows the average rate of 
appreciation or depreciation. The error term, ξ, of the mean equation (1) is assumed to 
have a time varying conditional variance, σ
2, specified by equation (2).  





t-1, and the distance between the spot and the target exchange rates, 
which is the major variable of our interest. Krugman’s (1991) model implies that δ is 
negative, i.e. the conditional volatility decreases as exchange rate moves towards the 
edge of the band, as long as the announced or implicit target zones are fully credible. 
The opposite is true for the target zones subject to speculative attacks and low 9 
credibility. Finally, we expect no relationship between the conditional variance and the 
target exchange rates if no implicit target zones are specified.  
Table 2 reports the estimations of (1) and (2) for the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia, and Romania between January 1, 1999, and October 11, 2006.
7 The 
results provide several interesting insights. First, the appreciation trend is confirmed for 
the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia. Our estimates at daily frequency imply an 
annual appreciation by 3 to 5 per cent. In turn, the Romanian leu and to a lesser degree 
the Hungarian forint depreciated significantly during the period. The former 
development corresponds to the de facto crawling peg applied by the Bank of Romania 
(see Crespo-Cuaresma et al., 2005b).  
Second, we can see that the conditional volatility significantly depends on actual 
lagged squared error term and lagged conditional variance of the error term. 
Furthermore, the sum of the ARCH and GARCH term is relatively high, which 
indicates that the volatility of the shocks in all countries is quite persistent. 
Nevertheless, the sum of both coefficients is significantly lower than unity in all 
countries except for Romania.  
Finally, we find that the deviation of the spot exchange rate from its target level is 
positive and highly significant for all the countries. This implies that as the target bands 
were implicit, they suffered generally under their low credibility. Similarly to e.g. 
Borghijs and Kuijs (2004) our results suggest that exchange rates do not act as shock 
absorbers. Our estimations show that exchange rate deviations from the medium-run 
average are characterized by significantly higher volatility. Thus, exchange rates may be 
a source of macroeconomic destabilization if they approach the ranges of the implicit 
target zones. The economic actors have to deal both with high deviations of exchange 
rates from their previous levels and their increased volatility. Nevertheless, we have to 
keep in mind that all coefficients are very small, although Hungary and Poland show the 
highest impact (in absolute value) of exchange rate deviations from the exchange rate 
target. In case of Slovakia, we have to include MA(1) in the mean equation to assure 
white noise in the residuals.  
 
                                                           
7  We report GARCH (1,1) for the ease of exposition as we find that this specification has the lowest 




Table 2: Estimates of the Effect of the Spot Position to the Target Value on 
Conditional Volatility (GARCH Models), January 1999 to October 2006  
Country Czech  Rep.  Hungary  Poland  Slovakia  Romania 
Μ  -0.013
* 0.005  -0.020  -0.011
* 0.024
** 



























  (3.472)  (24.097) (6.124) (5.988) (7.472) 






  [0.000] [0.005] [0.000] [0.000] [0.052] 
SIC  -8.610 -8.543 -7.388 -9.082 -7.630 
N  2028 2028 2028 2028 2028 
L-B(10),  RES  5.372 12.445 19.199 12.247 13.708 
  [0.865] [0.256] [0.038] [0.200] [0.187] 
L-B(10), SQRES  5.262 1.565  15.802 4.587 8.266 
  [0.873] [0.999] [0.105] [0.869] [0.603] 
Notes: We report z-statistics in parenthesis and p-values of the Wald test that γ2 + γ3 = 1 and the Ljung-
Box Q-statistics of the 10
th lag for standard and squared residuals in brackets. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent, respectively. For clarity of the discussion in the 
text, the coefficients μ and δ are multiplied by 100 and 10






Figure 2: Conditional Standard Deviation, January 1999 to October 2006 




















































As a robustness check, we estimated the GARCH models with Hodrick-Prescott 
filter as an alternative to the moving average time varying target rate, s
F. The results are 
largely unchanged.
8 Finally, we estimated the GARCH models also for the most recent 
sub-period after the countries (with the exception of Romania) joined the EU (that is, 
May 2004 to October 2006). We confirmed the positive coefficient for the distance of 
spot exchange rate from its implicit target value for all countries with the exception of 
the Czech Republic, while the coefficient for Poland is no longer significant (but 
positive) in this sub-sample (see Appendix).  
Figure 2 presents the conditional variance for all countries in our sample. The Czech 
Republic and Slovakia show a lower conditional variance than other countries of the 
region in selected periods. Nevertheless, we can see frequent changes of the conditional 
variance in all NMS.  
 
4.2 TARCH Models 
We can often see that the volatility of financial variables is different along positive and 
negative trends (see Engle and Ng, 1993). The downwards movements of share prices 
are usually associated with higher volatility of financial data. In this regard, Zakoïan 
(1990) and Glosten et al. (1993) proposed the threshold ARCH models to analyze 
asymmetric volatility.  
Economic policy may be also likely to fight against the currency depreciation more 
intensively than against the appreciation. One reason for this asymmetry can be the fact 
that countries in this region typically experience real exchange rate appreciation 
partially due to the Balassa-Samuelson effect (Égert and Lommatzsch, 2004, García 
Solanes et al., 2008, and MacDonald and Wojcik, 2008). Additionally, the ERM II has 
even some inherited certain asymmetric components as countries are allowed to 
appreciate the central parity, but its depreciation causes a violation of the exchange rate 
criterion (see de Grauwe and Schnabel, 2005).
9 This pattern of behavior may play an 
                                                           
8 We have also included the distance between the spot and implicit target rate in the mean equation. 
Except Romania, the coefficient was never significant at any obvious significance level. In case of 
Romania, we find that the positive impact of distance on the changes of exchange rate, which likely 
corresponds to the exchange rate policy of crawling band. These results are available upon request.  
9 In March 2007, Slovakia appreciated the central parity by more than 8 per cent.  13 
important role already during the preparation for the membership in the ERM II. Thus, 
the exchange rate target zones may be more credible if exchange rate is approaching the 
depreciation limit (that is, the upper bound according to our definition of exchange 
rates) of the implicit target band.  
In turn, national economic policies may define their objectives in relation to the 
national competitiveness. Several transition countries have been often concerned by the 
excessive exchange rate appreciation and some even aimed to stabilize its real exchange 
rate (see Coricelli et al., 2006). This may be especially important for the NMS with the 
strong appreciation trends due to the Balassa-Samuelson effect, deregulation of prices 
and tradable prices appreciation. Finally, market participants may behave differently if 
exchange rate is overvalued or undervalued. Actually, Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2005a) 
find important asymmetric volatility effects both in EU15 countries as well as in the 
NMS.  
Correspondingly, we extend the standard TARCH model as we take into account 
also the position of the spot exchange rate in relation to its target value. Our estimation 
specification is as follows,  
  jt j
D




















2 , (4) 
where D
arch is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the residual from the mean equation, 
ξt, is negative and zero otherwise. Similarly, D
s is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
spot exchange rate is lower than the target value, that is, if the exchange rate is in the 
appreciation part of the target zone.  
The asymmetric ARCH terms, γ4, is insignificant only in the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, while the coefficient is negative in Poland and Hungary, and positive in 
Romania. As a result, negative (squared) residuals from the mean equation lower 
significantly to the exchange rate volatility in Hungary and Poland. Because the 
residuals are computed only from the mean equation, this does not take into account 
whether the spot exchange rate is also below the target value (that is, in the appreciation 
part). For these two countries, the appreciation movements are less volatile also if they 
start in the depreciation part of the implicit target band. The opposite is true for 
Romania.  14 
 
Table 3: Asymmetric Estimates of the Effect of Spot Position to Target Value on 
Conditional Volatility (TARCH Models), January 1999 to October 2006  
Country Czech  Rep.  Hungary  Poland  Slovakia  Romania 
μ  -0.019
*** 0.004  -0.016  -0.012
* 0.018
* 




















  (58.196)  (172.148) (81.045) (63.517)  (129.651) 
γ4  0.017 -0.086
*** -0.085
*** -0.018  0.054
*** 
  (1.265) (-6.816) (-5.192) (-1.284)  (3.785) 
δ1 1.200
*** 1.760
*** 1.100  0.866
*** 1.730
*** 







  (5.276)  (18.062) (4.307) (6.090) (4.101) 






  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 






  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.053] 
SIC  -8.611 -8.560 -7.392 -9.083 -7.629 
N  2028 2028 2028 2028 2028 
L-B(10),  RES  5.709 11.321 15.462 11.773 11.948 
  [0.839] [0.333] [0.051] [0.226] [0.289] 
L-B(10), SQRES    4.440  1.577  13.125  4.264  6.945 
  [0.925] [0.999] [0.108] [0.893] [0.731] 
Notes: We report z-stats in parenthesis and p-values of the Wald test that γ2 + γ3 = 1 and γ2 + γ3 + γ4 = 1, 
as well as the Ljung-Box Q-statistics of the 10
th lag for standard and squared residuals in brackets. ***, 
**, and * denote significance at 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent, respectively. For clarity of the 
discussion in the text, coefficients μ and δ are multiplied by 100 and 10




Figure 3: Conditional Standard Deviation and the Deviation of Spot Exchange 
Rate from the Target Rate, January 1999 to October 2006 
















































































































Furthermore, we can see that that the asymmetric effects of exchange rate 
misalignments, δ2, are significant in all countries (see Table 3).
10 Negative deviations of 
the spot exchange rate from the target value (that is, spot exchange rate located in the 
appreciation area) increase significantly the volatility of daily exchange rates. This 
finding indicates that the target zones are less credible in the appreciation part in these 
countries.
11 By contrast, we can see that the persistence of exchange rate shocks is lower 
during the appreciation periods. Only in Romania we can find as before that the 
exchange rate volatility is persistent in the appreciation area of the implicit target zone.  
Additionally, we performed several sensitivity analyses similar to those for GARCH 
models. First, the time varying implicit target rate was proxied by Hodrick-Prescott 
filter instead of moving average. Next, EGARCH model was applied to assess the 
asymmetries further. Overall, the results from sensitivity analysis confirm those of 
baseline specification.  
Figure 3 documents the asymmetrical relationship between the exchange rate 
volatility and the relative level of exchange rates as compared to the targets based on the 
results reported in Table 3. On the one hand, we can see that the conditional variance 
increases as the actual exchange rate deviates from its implicit target rate. This 
relationship seems to be asymmetric in all NMS except for Poland. In particular, the 
relationship between the exchange rate deviations from the target value is steeper in the 
appreciation area.  
On the other hand, the points with the extreme conditional volatility are often 
observed around the target values of exchange rates, which is consistent with the target 
zone model. However, there are also observations with comparably high values of 
exchange rate volatility in the depreciation area of the implicit target zones especially in 
Hungary, Slovakia and Romania.  
 
 
                                                           
10 Correspondingly, the development pattern of exchange rate volatility is similar to that presented in 
Figure 2. Detailed results are available upon request from authors.  
11 Note that, by definition, the opposite is true for the depreciation side of the target zone.  17 
5 Conclusions 
We analyze high frequency exchange rate dynamics in selected NMS that introduced 
inflation targeting regime. Our sample consists of five NMS (Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia and Romania). These countries maintained relatively free exchange 
rates between 1999 and 2006.  
Following the target zone model by Krugman (1991), we examine the exchange rate 
volatility in connection to the estimated target exchange rate. We estimate GARCH 
models of daily exchange rate volatility. We find that the volatility is quite persistent in 
all NMS. In addition, the exchange rate is more volatile if it is far away from its implicit 
target rate in all analyzed countries. This indicates that there may be implicit exchange 
rate target zones in some of these countries, however, which suffer under insufficient 
credibility. Finally, our TARCH results point to systematic asymmetries in the exchange 
rate volatility in the NMS. The volatility of exchange rate is significantly more 
pronounced especially during the periods of exchange rate appreciation in all analyzed 
countries.  
Given the persistent volatility of exchange rates in all analyzed NMS, the policy of 
inflation targeting seems to be an attractive option before the euro adoption. Our 
sensitivity analysis for the recent period (2004 to 2006) showed that Poland and the 
Czech Republic, that is the countries with the longest experience with inflation 
targeting, have experienced also less volatility of exchange rate with respect to its 
medium-term target level.  
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Appendix: Sensitivity Analysis  
 
In addition to the comparison of GARCH and TARCH models, this appendix presents 
additional sensitivity analysis according the following lines. First, we use the Hodrick-
Prescott filter in Table A.1 to proxy the target value of the exchange rate instead of the 
moving average. The smoothing parameter of the Hodrick Prescott filter was selected as 
λ = 6,812,100, which corresponds to approximately s = 261 trading days (the average 
number of trading days in our data sample) and the generalized relationship λ = 100 s
2 
(see Artis et al., 2003, Appendix E, page 53). We estimate the GARCH and TARCH 
models for the same period in order to make the results directly comparable.  
Second, we present our estimations for the period after nearly all analyzed countries 
(except Romania) joined the EU (that is, May 2004 to October 2006). The EU 
membership can present a structural break in several time series e.g. due to improved 
access to the EU market in the area of sensitive products and increased export revenues. 
Foreign direct investment increased also during the accession to the EU. Romania, for 
example, experienced a reversal of the depreciation trend to exchange rate appreciation 
in 2004 (see Figure 1). Although Romania did not join the EU in May 2004, the 
negotiations on the accession of Romania (and Bulgaria) progressed significantly 
around this date.  
Furthermore, the recent period excludes the first years of inflation targeting policy 
in the Czech Republic and Poland (inflation targeting was officially introduced in 1998 
in both countries), which might be less credible in the first year of application. We 
expect that countries following pure inflation targeting policy are likely to show no 
significant differences in exchange rate volatility with respect to the target exchange 
rates. Alternatively, we used also different sub-samples (e.g. the ERM II membership of 
Slovakia), which are available upon request.  
Both extensions confirm the previous results. Mostly important from the perspective 
of the analyzed topic, the deviation between the spot exchange rate and the various 
proxies of the target level is found to be positive and significant for all countries except 
Poland and the Czech Republic in the period of the EU membership. In the former case, 
the coefficient is positive while insignificant, while it is negative and insignificant at the 
latter case. Actually, this finding confirms our previous conclusions, because both 21 
Poland and the Czech Republic have followed efficiently the policy of inflation 
targeting in this period. Thus, we can see that the application of the inflation targeting 
helps possibly to reduce the volatility of the exchange rates.  
We performed both extensions also for TARCH models with similar results (see 
Table A.3 and A.4). Furthermore, we estimated asymmetric effects also in exponential 
generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (EGARCH) models proposed 
by Nelson (1991), which are defined as  
  jt j
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2 log ) log(
, 
Similarly to TARCH models, D
s denotes a dummy variable equal to 1 if the spot 
exchange rate is lower than the target value. Thus, we can again see whether the 
deviation between the spot and target exchange rates has asymmetric effects on 
exchange rate volatility in addition to asymmetric leverage effects, which are shown by 
a significant coefficient γ3.  
Table A.5 presents the results of our EGARCH estimations. Stationarity constraint 
is met if γ4  <  1. Although this coefficient is again relatively high, the stationarity 
criterion is fulfilled in all countries. We can see that the asymmetric leverage effects are 
confirmed for all countries except the Czech Republic. Finally, the exchange rate 
position with respect to its target value has asymmetric effects in the Czech Republic, 
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Table A.1: Estimates of the Effect of the Spot Position to the Target Value on 
Conditional Volatility (GARCH Models), Target Value Proxied by the HP Filter, 
January 1999 to October 2006  
Country Czech  Rep.  Hungary  Poland  Slovakia  Romania 
μ -0.014
**  0.005 -0.021 -0.009  0.028
*** 



























  (5.346)  (20.585) (7.006) (6.935) (8.022) 





  [0.052] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.113] 
SIC  -8.615 -8.588 -7.399 -9.096 -7.632 
N  2028 2028 2028 2028 2028 
L-B(10),  RES  5.630 11.463 21.411 11.170 13.625 
  [0.845] [0.323] [0.018] [0.264] [0.191] 
L-B(10), SQRES  6 2.519  15.832 2.843 6.688 
  [0.815] [0.991] [0.105] [0.970] [0.754] 
Notes: We report z-statistics in parenthesis and p-values of the Wald test that γ2 + γ3 = 1 and the Ljung-
Box Q-statistics of the 10
th lag for standard and squared residuals in brackets. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent, respectively. For clarity of the discussion in the 
text, coefficients μ and δ are multiplied by 100 and 10
4, respectively.  23 
 
Table A.2: Estimates of the Effect of the Spot Position to the Target Value on 
Conditional Volatility (GARCH Models), EU Membership Sub-Sample,  
May 2004 to October 2006  
Country Czech  Rep.  Hungary  Poland  Slovakia  Romania 
Μ  -0.022
** -0.003  -0.049
** -0.018
* -0.007 
  (-2.124) (-0.222) (-2.380) (-1.654) (-0.565) 
γ1  0.000
* 0.000 0.000  0.000
** 0.000 














  (45.785) (47.926) (18.574) (52.369)  (100.242) 
δ -0.033  1.900
*** 2.920  0.526
** 3.510
*** 
  (-0.053) (2.993) (1.424) (2.528) (7.453) 





  [0.067] [0.023] [0.076] [0.000] [0.535] 
SIC  -8.910 -8.210 -7.663 -9.123 -8.183 
N  638 638 638 638 638 
L-B(10), RES  18.202
* 16.774
* 13.424 10.748  4.428 
  [0.052] [0.080] [0.201] [0.293] [0.926] 
L-B(10), SQRES  16.696
*  13.526 8.466 2.436 4.867 
  [0.081] [0.196] [0.583] [0.983] [0.900] 
Notes: We report z-statistics in parenthesis and p-values of the Ljung-Box Q-statistics of the 10
th lag for 
standard and squared residuals in brackets. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1 per cent, 5 per cent, 
and 10 per cent, respectively. For clarity of the discussion in the text, the coefficients μ are multiplied by 
100.  24 
 
Table A.3: Estimates of the Effect of the Spot Position to the Target Value on 
Conditional Volatility (TARCH Models), Target Value Proxied by the HP Filter, 
January 1999 to October 2006 
Country Czech  Rep.  Hungary  Poland  Slovakia  Romania 
μ  -0.018
** 0.008  -0.018  -0.016
*** 0.022
** 




*** 0.000 0.000 



































  (3.088)  (12.518) (3.983) (9.792) (2.784) 






  [0.000] [0.054] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 






  [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.012] 
SIC  -8.610 -8.606 -7.404 -9.094 -7.630 
N  2028 2028 2028 2028 2028 
L-B(10), RES  5.957  9.609  16.640
** 9.966  12.414 
  [0.819] [0.475] [0.034] [0.353] [0.258] 
L-B(10), SQRES    5.288  2.668  12.786  14.060  5.852 
  [0.871] [0.988] [0.119] [0.120] [0.828] 
Notes: We report z-stats in parenthesis and p-values of the Wald test that γ2 + γ3 = 1 and γ2 + γ3 + γ4 = 1, 
as well as the Ljung-Box Q-statistics of the 10
th lag for standard and squared residuals in brackets. ***, 
**, and * denote significance at 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent, respectively. For clarity of the 
discussion in the text, coefficients μ and δ are multiplied by 100 and 10
4, respectively.  
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Table A.4: Estimates of the Effect of the Spot Position to the Target Value on 
Conditional Volatility (TARCH Models), EU Membership Sub-Sample,  
May 2004 to October 2006  
Country Czech  Rep.  Hungary  Poland  Slovakia  Romania 
μ  -0.032
*** 0.012  -0.048
** -0.027
** -0.016 
  (-2.997)  (0.768) (-2.339) (-2.458) (-1.244) 
γ1  0.000 0.000
** 0.000
** 0.000 0.000 
  (1.137) (2.080) (2.256)  (-1.536) (0.218) 
γ2  -0.004 0.144
*** 0.003  0.013
** 0.045
*** 
  (-0.235) (4.404) (0.391) (2.226) (2.917) 
γ3  0.058
** -0.152
*** -0.027  -0.018
*** 0.212
*** 







  (45.627)  (34.852) (119.149) (217.220)  (66.309) 
δ1 0.380  3.680
** 1.200  0.312
** 2.510
*** 
  (0.883) (2.363) (1.640) (2.479) (6.539) 
δ2 4.320




  (2.906)  (-1.370) (3.873) (5.922) (5.629) 
γ2 + γ3 = 1  0.943
*** 1.036  0.985
** 0.999  0.888
*** 
  [0.000] [0.106] [0.012] [0.578] [0.000] 




  [0.961] [0.961] [0.006] [0.000] [0.000] 
SIC  -8.923 -8.213 -7.674 -9.133 -8.215 
N  638 638 638 638 638 
L-B(10),  RES  17.704 16.306 13.397 12.111  4.083 
  [0.060] [0.091] [0.202] [0.278] [0.944] 
L-B(10), SQRES    15.899  14.184  10.340  9.434  2.715 
  [0.103] [0.165] [0.411] [0.492] [0.987] 
Notes: We report z-stats in parenthesis and p-values of the Wald test that γ2 + γ3 = 1 and γ2 + γ3 + γ4 = 1, 
as well as the Ljung-Box Q-statistics of the 10
th lag for standard and squared residuals in brackets. ***, 
**, and * denote significance at 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent, respectively. For clarity of the 
discussion in the text, coefficients μ and δ are multiplied by 100 and 10
4, respectively.  26 
 
Table A.5: Estimates of the Effect of the Spot Position to the Target Value on 
Conditional Volatility (EGARCH Models)  
Country Czech  Rep.  Hungary  Poland  Slovakia  Romania 
μ  -0.021
*** 0.015
*** -0.014  -0.011
* 0.027
*** 














  (11.190) (19.861)  (8.428) (12.298) (19.175) 












  (113.836) (353.735) (145.001) (109.500) (282.682) 
δ1 0.935
*** 5.576
*** 0.289  1.578
*** 0.499
** 






  (6.373) (8.092) (5.675) (6.894) (1.600) 
SIC  -8.614 -8.604 -7.400 -9.089 -7.623 
N  2028 2028 2028 2028 2028 
L-B(10), RES  5.983  11.674  21.848
** 13.888 12.486 
  [0.817] [0.307] [0.016] [0.126] [0.254] 
L-B(10), SQRES    6.453  5.007  16.936
* 5.785 9.390 
  [0.776] [0.891] [0.076] [0.761] [0.496] 
Notes: We report z-statistics in parenthesis and the Ljung-Box Q-statistics of the 10
th lag for standard and 
squared residuals in brackets. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent, 
respectively.  
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